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OF SCIENCE AND SEMIOTICS OF ARTS 
CHRISTOPH HUBIG 
The thesis of this paper is thai the direct application of Peirce's semiotic 
to the arts has been based upon a number of misunderstandings. Two false 
assumptions have played a cardinal role. The first is that Peirce's semiotic 
represents a scientific method instead of representing a theory of a scientific 
method. which it actually is; in orhcr words, it is a metatheory. This 
corresponds (Q the fal se assumption that Peirce's categories of sign 
classification and imerpretant dassifiC3lion are inSITuments of research 
instead of being metatheoretical categories that can be used to describe and 
analyze concrete events of sign communication (for example. science). The 
second and more crucial assumption concerns the application of the 
interpretant to science as opposed to the arts. Here it is overlooked that in 
science, interpretants carry the sole responsibility for the constitution of 
meaning, whereas in the arts, divergence from the interpretants upon which 
a work is based plays the decisive role. As a result of this distinction, the 
developments of science and of the arts arc governed by different laws. 
At this poim, I intend to discuss the former assumption in more detail. 
Peirce's pragmatism as well as his pragmat icism represent a concept of the 
theory of science. It is the method by which sign communication, especially 
that of a scientific nature, is achieved, described, analyzed, and established. 
The examples that Peirce employed to develop his theory were taken mostly 
from situations of everyday life or from science. Only rarely did he make 
reference to the arts (for example. music).' Rather than serving as objects of 
analysis, however, his examples wefe used to clarify his theoretical semiotic 
concepts. It is pan of his concept that the category "interpretant " and its 
uniform application to the areas of science and the arts represent a moot 
point. Peirce used the category " interpretant" to show how certain objects 
are able to function as signs. The objects were then designated as 
instruments in order to be in accordance with Peirce's concept of the 
intentional aspect of their nature.~ Signs represent constructions of 
communicating subjects and are construed as such by them. 
It is necessary to have a guideline that directs the application of the 
instrumems to ideas or objects. In other words. a sign embodies a trinity of 
elements. It is the imerpretant as the proper significate effect which fulfills 
the semantic operation of a sign. This allowed Peirce to employ a twofold 
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interpretation of the "proper significate cHect'" as onl' that nOl only 
functions to creale meaning. but also functions as the result of the grasping 
of the meaning. in \\'hich cast' the interprt·tam is the "proper signHicatl' 
outcome.". These operations 3ft' generally di\'ided into thret' subcategories: 
(a) the so-called "emotional" interprelanlS that serve, for « ..xample. as 
guidelines in reference 10 music ("C('cling"); (b) the "energelic" or 
"dynamic" inlerpretants that represent the psychophysiological aspects of 
communication; and (e) lastly. the " logical " interprt'lams thai embody 
habits in the form of behavior paul'rns. However. the fact that Ihest' 
interpretams exist as memal paucrns and can be inu.'rpn'reo only by means 
or additional interpretants, leads one to ('onstruci a regressus ad inrinitum. 
The "logical" interpretants are necessary for lhe formulation o{ a scientiric 
theor)' in that they guarantee the common inll'rpretation or signs. This ran 
allows {or the de\le)opmenl of a pragmaticistic or transcendental 
pragmaticistic theory of science. The more dearly the logical interpretams 
are defined, the more intersubjective a Iheory \\.,ill pro\'e to be. 
However, the employment of Peirce's imerpretant classification for the 
purpose of semiological investigations can be compared to the use of Kant 's 
categories lO build a steam engine, Peirce did not deal with instruments for 
the analysis of concrete signs. but with categories or models that lay bare the 
diHerent fashions by which sign communication originates and pertains to 
meaning. Neither the misleadingly exact classification of intcrpretants, nor 
the distinction made between the terms 'symbol'. 'index', and 'icon' sene to 
alter this fact. 
Umberto Eco as well as diverse semiologists havc recently tfled applying 
Peirce's concept of the interpretant to the arts in an attempt to achievc a 
definition of semiotics relevant not only to science bUl to all fields . In doing 
so, they make use of a false principle which is bound up with two 
important problems. Problem I; Although the use of pragmatism does 
indeed expand the interpretam's plane or reference, it also creates a new 
problem by conrusing these theoretic planes. \"ithout seeming to find it 
problematic. Eco describes this phenomenon in the following terms: "Der 
BegrH£ des Interpretans ist gerade in seinem Rdchtum und in seiner 
Ungenauigkeit (ruchtbar, wei I er uns leigt, wie die Kommunikation 
vermittels cines Systems kominuierlicher Kommulationen durch das 
Verweisen von Zeichen IU Zeichen ... die kulturellen Einheiten umschreibl. " S 
The relationship that the logical interpretant's degree of definition bears 
to the degree of a theory's intersubjectivity (as outlined above in subcategory 
"c") pertains only 10 the natural sciences. In dealing with the arts. Eco 
seems to refute the possibility of clear and exact identification of the 
mterpretant. Though the matter is a complex one, it is confusion of the 
theoretical with the metatheoretical planes that is the source of 
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misunderstanding. A more concrete form of signs does nm exisL None are, 
for example. just a symbol, an index, or an icon; and neither signs nor their 
origins can be explained more concretely by the use of a single class of 
imerpretants. However. this classification can be viewed as a categorical 
screen that enables us to describe methods or understanding signs. especially 
scientific ones. In spile of numerous auempts at dassHication. these 
categories have not remained too general, but rather lOO vague, for 
application to a number of different fields. On their own theoretical level, 
they are exactly derined. 
Now] wish to consider the second assumption. This is the more crucial 
point. \Vriters such as Eco. Granger, and Nauiez6 believe that by conceiving 
the generality and imprecision of the imerpretant in the arts to be an 
"asymptotic approximation"7 (Eco) of the model upon which a work of art 
is based, it is possible to formulate the concept of interpretam, in reference 
to the arts, more precisely. A question remains, however: Is this the 
principle upon which the genesis as well as the perception of an artwork is 
based? \Vhereas emotional and dynamic interpretants do not demand an 
answer to this question, the logical imerprelants are another mauer. ]£ the 
substance of the arts were identical in character 10 that of the sciences it 
would only be possible to create according to "natural laws." The fixed and 
exactly defined logical interpretants would dictate the manner in which the 
signs expressing the artistic code are conceived of as well as the fashion in 
which an artwork is perceived. Nietzsche labeled the reduction of an to such 
style categories as "stylistic barbarism," barbarism that expresses itself in 
stylistic terms. The concept of art as a type of divergence. however, has been 
expounded in the works of Hegel, Lukics, and Adorno, who trace it back in 
pan to the Greeks. ' It expresses the fact that a work of art (as opposed to the 
trade languages of science) cannot be completely reduced to imerpretants_ 
To be sure, in order to understand the production and perception of art 
worts in terms of signs, one must first postulate interpretams. Hegel said, 
"The connoisseur interprets that which he has heard in terms of the laws 
and rules he is familiar with. "9 This is necessary in order to understand the 
cHect of an artwork's calculated divergence from a given norm. For it is just 
this characteristic divergence from the imerpretants (in the form of a model) 
that gives birth to the expressive moments of a work. One needs to be 
familiar with sonata form (as an interpretant) in order to be able to grasp 
the characteristic substance of Beethoven's works. In the same way, an 
understanding of the norms upon which nineteenth ceolUry tonality is 
based is indispensable for comprehending the significance of \Vagner's 
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divergence from it, JUSI as lhe apprecialion of Goya (as opposed 10 
Velasquez) is dependem upon a knowledge of lhe habilS which imbue lhe 
tradition or the painting of Spanish nobilit),. or the comprehension of 
Beckett's plays is based on familiarity with certain traditions. However, it is 
to be stressed that these examples cannOl be reduced (0 mere intcrpretams. 
not even asymptotically. 
If one then views the production and perception of an as the divergen[c 
from interpretams. it is possible to postulate the principle upon which the 
development of an is founded. In the course of (ime. a divergence can be 
transformed into a norm so that a school or a uadition will be based upon 
it. New codes are formed only indirectly-ex negath'o-in the generalization 
of divergences from norm in an works. I£ new codes were immediately 
created in the anwork-as some investigators postulate-they would be the 
equivalent o[ private languages. The expressiveness of a work then becomes 
dependent upon a deviation [rom this new norm . In [his fashion . lhl' 
deviation from the original system conlinues becoming more and more 
exaggerated until the divergence is so great that the original model can no 
longer be recognized. At this point. new stylistic norms, systems, and 
interpretams come into being. The history and development of an is the 
history of continued divergences from continually developing interprel3nrs. 
In contrast to that. the developmem of science or normal communication is 
governed by a completely different principle. In this casc, new habits art" 
transformed into (implicit) conventions by means of the community of 
investigators. and the system of interpretative categories is altered in the 
long run by attempts to achieve a common understanding of them via 
consensus rather than by the mechanism of di\'ergence. If it is to function as 
a meta theory o[ the ans, semiotics must certainly take this dirference into 
aCCOunt. 
